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GROUNDWATER JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT: THE TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER 
DILEMMA 
Philip M. Quatrochi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, groundwater has become an increas-
ingly important source of irrigation and drinking water in the United 
States.1 The United States uses twice as much water per capita as 
any other nation in the world,2 and ninety percent of the United 
States's fresh water is groundwater.3 Groundwater sources also sup-
ply approximately half of the drinking water nationally.4 Despite the 
United States's reliance on groundwater and the serious harm that 
can result from groundwater contamination, no federal statute com-
prehensively addresses the prevention of groundwater pollution. 
Surface water contamination long has been a major concern of both 
the public and Congress, but groundwater contamination historically 
has received little national attention.5 It generally was believed that 
groundwater was pristine and that contaminants percolating through 
the ground would adhere to the soil or would degrade by natural 
processes.6 It is now known that the soil and rock layers of the earth 
* Topics Editor, Articles Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. 
1 See JOSEPH L. sAX & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 786 
(1986). 
2 PETER ROGERS, AMERICA'S WATER 4 (1993). 
3 See ZACHARY A. SMITH, GROUNDWATER IN THE WEST 4 (1989). 
4 See id. 
6 1 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER FROM 
CONTAMINATION 20 (1984) [hereinafter PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER]. 
6Id. 
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have a finite capacity to filter out contaminants and to protect ground-
water.7 There is also a growing public awareness of the decline of 
groundwater quality and the possible threat to human health from 
groundwater contamination.8 
The Clean Water Act9 (CWA) contains provisions that are applica-
ble to groundwater,to but attempts to assert CWA authority to pre-
vent groundwater pollution have met with mixed results in the courts.ll 
The major dispute has been over whether the CWNs protection of 
"navigable waters"12 includes the protection of groundwater.13 Although 
courts generally have excluded nontributary groundwater from cov-
erage under the CWA,14 courts have split on affording tributary 
groundwater the CWA protections.15 Including or excluding tributary 
groundwater from the scope of the CWA can have far-reaching implica-
tions. Courts including tributary groundwater within the scope of the 
CWA allow that statute to protect both groundwater and the surface 
waters that groundwater feeds.16 Attempts to protect the quality of 
surface waters may prove fruitless if contaminated tributary ground-
waters pollute surface waters.17 
This Comment explores how courts have interpreted the extent of 
groundwater jurisdiction under the CWA and analyzes the competing 
methodologies that have led to different conclusions on CWA ground-
water jurisdiction. Section II explores the hydrological characteristics 
of groundwater and the legal doctrines applicable to groundwater. 
Section II also examines the specific provisions of the CWA relevant 
7 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GROUND WATER VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT: CON-
TAMINATION POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 13 (1993). 
8 [d. at 20. 
933 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
10 See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra section III. 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). "Navigable waters" are defined further by the CWA as "waters of the 
United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
13 See generally Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. GAF 
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975); see infra notes 134-92 and accompanying text. 
14 Nontributary groundwater is groundwater that does not discharge into any surface waters. 
Tributary groundwater is groundwater that does discharge into surface waters. See infra notes 
57...ul and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 141-92, 215-U5, 282-315 and accompanying text. 
16 See, e.g., McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196 
(E.D. Cal. 1988); Kelley v. United States (Kelley 1), No. 79-10199, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 
28,1980). 
17 See Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The Crucial Link in 
Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 592 (1988) (citing 
United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 1974». 
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to groundwater, the administrative interpretations of this statutory 
language, and the relevant legislative history of the CWA. Section III 
examines the CW Algroundwater case law and compares the approaches 
of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits towards CWA groundwater juris-
diction. Section III also addresses two recent cases, Village of Ocono-
mowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp.18 and Sierra Club v. Colorado 
Refining CO.,19 that reached opposite conclusions as to whether tribu-
tary groundwater is covered under the CWA. Section IV analyzes the 
different conclusions on groundwater jurisdiction under the CWA and 
suggests that all courts adopt the approach of the Tenth Circuit 
and give full effect to the intent of the CWA by including tributary 
groundwater within the coverage of the CWA. 
II. GROUNDWATER AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The scientific principles behind groundwater and groundwater flow 
are helpful to understanding courts' analyses, particularly when tribu-
tary groundwater issues are raised. The legal principles governing 
groundwater, the language of the CWA, the CW.lts legislative history, 
and administrative interpretations of CWA language are also impor-
tant because they frequently are referred to in CWA groundwater 
cases and are used by courts as justifications for reaching particular 
conclusions. 
A. Scientific Groundwater Principles 
Groundwater movement is governed by the laws of physics and 
local geological formations and ground water travels at variable speeds 
and in different ways through different geologic formations.20 The 
variability is primarily a function of the pressure of gravity and the 
permeability of the geologic formations.21 Groundwater is stored in 
permeable formations that are bounded and contained by imperme-
able formations.22 Permeable materials such as gravel easily permit 
18 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.), em. denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994). 
19 838 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Colo. 1993); appeal dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (loth Cir. 1994). 
20 GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 223 (1984). 
21 [d. at 223. Groundwater formations generally are classified as aquifers, aquitards, aqui-
eludes, and aquifuges. [d. Aquifers are formations "that transmit water freely[.]" [d. Aquitards 
"store water and allow some passage of water but not enough for a well[.]" [d. Aquieludes are 
"permeable enough to store water but do not transmit enough water to be useful[.]" [d. 
Aquifuges are impermeable formations, such as solid granite. [d. 
22 [d. 
, 
, 
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the flow of groundwater, while denser materials such as clay impede 
the flow of groundwater.23 Groundwater also is found flowing in un-
derground channels directly beneath surface rivers and streams.24 
An important feature of groundwater hydrology is the aquifer, a 
groundwater formation that freely transmits water.25 An aquifer is 
functionally an underground reservoir-a storage site for groundwa-
ter.26 Initially, aquifers are "filled with water either by geological 
processes occurring when the rock was created ... or by subsequent 
sources such as rainfall ... "27 Recharge of an aquifer occurs through 
precipitation falling into the aquifer where the aquifer is exposed to 
the surface, or through surface or underground streams flowing into 
the aquifer.28 When an aquifer is hydraulically linked to surface wa-
ters, the groundwater is tributary to the surface water.29 Aquifers also 
may connect to other aquifers through underground channels and link 
apparently separate surface bodies of water,30 or may be completely 
isolated from other surface or subsurface waters.31 
Because groundwater is by definition underground water, it is difficult 
to observe accurately. Although the technology currently exists for 
obtaining hydrogeologic information, there always will be some un-
certainty about groundwater contamination because groundwater is 
inaccessible to direct observation.32 The lack of time, money, and skilled 
personnel constrain accurate groundwater assessment, including con-
tamination detection, protection, monitoring, and prevention activi-
ties.33 Moreover, groundwater samples only reveal the quality of the 
groundwater at the specific moment in time that the samples are 
taken, providing little information about contamination sources or the 
potential for future contamination.34 
The uncertainty of various corrective techniques, the length of time 
and the amount of money required to institute corrective measures, 
and the need for skilled professionals to implement such measures 
23 [d. at 222. 
24 See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 19 (2d ed. 1988). 
25 GETCHES, supra note 20, at 223. 
26 See id. at 224. 
27 [d. at 225. 
2B [d. 
29 See id. at 226. 
30 See GETCHES, supra note 20, at 226. 
31 [d. 
32 See PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 9. 
33 [d. at 8-9. 
34 [d. at 10. 
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hamper corrective actions for groundwater contamination.35 Correc-
tive actions are further complicated when there are multiple contami-
nants present because of the uncertainty in dealing with fluctuating 
contaminant concentrations.36 Additionally, corrective actions may pro-
duce detrimental environmental side-effects.37 Groundwater contami-
nation also tends to be more concentrated and takes longer to decon-
taminate than surface water because the infiltration of rainwater, 
which dilutes contaminants, is limited.38 
Thus, the peculiar nature of groundwater requires courts to ad-
dress issues such as underground formations, groundwater flow, and 
detection or proof of contamination.39 These issues are frequently 
important in CWA groundwater cases and are of particular impor-
tance when courts deal with tributary groundwater issues.4o 
B. Legal Principles of Groundwater 
The legal rules governing ownership of groundwater, like those 
governing surface water, vary from state to state.41 Because most 
groundwater resources originate from a common source, however, 
groundwater rights are generally more complex than surface water 
rights.42 Currently, there are five major groundwater doctrines in 
use in the United States: absolute ownership,43 prior appropriation,44 
groundwater as a public resource,45 reasonable use,46 and correlative 
rights.47 Legislators cited this variety of groundwater rights systems 
35 See id. at 8-9. 
36Id. at 10. 
37 PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 10. For example, closing a 
well might allow continued migration of contaminants, or excavation may transfer contaminants 
to surface waters or the air. See id. 
38 See GOLDFARB, supra note 24, at 42--43. 
39 See infra notes 141-92, 215---{j5, 282-315 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 141-92, 215---U5, 282-315 and accompanying text. 
41 See ROGERS, supra note 2, at 9l. 
42Id. 
43 GETCHES, supra note 20, at 232-34. Absolute ownership means that the landowner owns 
and has an unlimited right to any water found beneath the owned land. Id. at 232-33. 
44 Id. at 234-36. Prior appropriation gives the strongest legal right to the person first using 
the water. Id. at 234. 
45Id. at 236-37. Public resource jurisdictions acknowledge no private ownership rights in 
groundwater and consider it under the management of public property. Id. at 236. 
46Id. at 238-39. Reasonable use allows a "landowner to withdraw water for reasonable 
beneficial uses ... without liability for harm to adjoining landowners." Id. at 239. 
47Id. at 239--42. Correlative rights seeks to give each landowner of a common groundwater 
supply a fair and just proportion of the supply. Each landowner is entitled to a reasonable share 
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in the legislative history of the CWA as a justification for leaving 
groundwater authority to individual states.48 
Courts distinguish not only between different ownership rights to 
groundwater, but between different types of groundwater as well.49 
For example, courts distinguish between underground flows of sur-
face watercourses, underground streams, and percolating groundwa-
ter, and important legal consequences depend on these distinctions. 50 
Underground flow of surface streams refers to the saturated zone 
directly beneath a river or lake which is in direct contact with surface 
water. 51 When this underground flow can be identified, it is simply 
considered part of the watercourse. 52 An underground stream is "water 
that passes through or under the surface in a definite channel."53 
Percolating groundwater refers to all waters passing underground 
without a definite channel and to groundwater that is not linked 
directly to surface waters. 54 
Courts addressing groundwater within the context of the CWA 
additionally have looked at whether the groundwater in question was 
tributary or nontributary.55 Tributary groundwater is groundwater 
that discharges into surface waters.56 Nontributary groundwater is 
groundwater that does not flow into surface waters or that "has a 
velocity of flow ... so slow that [the groundwater] is treated as not 
of the common groundwater supply, generally based upon the amount of land he owns. Id. at 
240. 
48 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 
3739; see infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. The legislative history of the CWA implies 
that Congress assumed that a federal groundwater program would be unworkable given the 
non-uniformity of state groundwater rights. See id. 
49 See GOLDFARB, supra note 24, at 18. 
fjJ Id. 
51 See id. at 19. 
52 See id. 
53Id. Goldfarb also states, "[i]n water law, a subterranean stream is treated as a surface 
watercourse. There is a legal presumption against groundwater being an underground stream; 
that is, a claimant must produce convincing evidence that underground water flows in a definite 
and known channel, and does not 'percolate' as in an aquifer." Id. (citation omitted). 
54 See GOLDFARB, supra note 24, at 19. Sources of percolating water include precipitation, 
streamflow, irrigation return flow, and artificial recharge. Id. In many states, water rights to 
percolating waters are drastically different than rights to underground streams. Colorado, for 
example, distinguishes between tributary and nontributary percolating waters. Id. Groundwa-
ter that eventually will flow into a natural stream, above or below ground, legally is considered 
part of that same stream. Id. 
55 See, e.g., Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.), 
eert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994); Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (7th Cir. 1990). 
56 Wood, supra note 17, at 570. 
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flowing into surface waters."57 Most groundwater, however, does flow 
into surface waters.58 Moreover, it is doubtful whether any groundwa-
ter is nontributary, because all groundwater continually flows toward 
some point of discharge. 59 Categorizing groundwater as tributary or 
non tributary may be a completely artificial distinction, but it is none-
theless a distinction courts make. 
C. Federal Approaches to Groundwater Protection 
Currently, there is no comprehensive federal protection for ground-
water resources.60 As one commentator has noted, "[g]roundwater 
legislation is critical because this is the last part of the hydrological 
cycle to be regulated, and the hydrological imperatives require it to 
be integrated into the pattern of management immediately."61 Despite 
the critical need for groundwater legislation, only a patchwork of 
federal legislation currently exists. 
Several federal statutes have addressed peripherally the protec-
tion of the United States's groundwater. Congress enacted the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)62 in 1974 to "assure that water supply 
systems serving the public meet minimum national standards for 
protection of public health."63 The SDWA authorizes the creation of 
drinking water standards and the establishment of a program to 
regulate underground injections in order to protect drinking water 
supplies.64 The SDWA, however, falls short of protecting all ground-
water because it only protects aquifers supplying public water sys-
tems.65 Thus, many private wells used for purely domestic consumption 
are not covered by the SDWA.66 The Resource Conservation and Re-
57Id. 
58Id. 
59 See JOSEPH S. DEVINNY ET AL., SUBSURFACE MIGRATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES 47 
(1990). Groundwater continually moves through aquifers as part of the hydrologic cycle, con-
stantly flowing from its point of recharge to a point of discharge. Id. 
60 See PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 77. 
61Id. at 195. For a detailed analysis of the United States's groundwater policy through 1984, 
see generally J. Stephen Dycus, Development of a National Groundwater Protection Policy, 11 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 211 (1984). 
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Wood, supra note 17, at 570. 
66Id. 
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covery Act (RCRA)67 protects only groundwater threatened by dis-
charges from waste disposal facilities.68 The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)69 regu-
lates the cleanup of hazardous waste disposal, but does not contain any 
preventative measures for protecting groundwater.7o Several other 
federal laws also have limited applicability to groundwater protection, 
but they too fail to offer complete protection.71 
Groundwater pollution has continued relatively unabated because 
no federal legislation or authority was concerned specifically with 
comprehensive groundwater protection.72 In 1987, the independent 
National Groundwater Policy Forum led by Bruce Babbit, now Sec-
retary of the Interior, stressed the urgency of federal involvement in 
groundwater protection and urged the enactment of a federal statute 
establishing groundwater protection.73 However, disputes over the 
proper agency roles, coupled with the belief that state and local gov-
ernments were better equipped to deal with their own groundwater 
problems, impeded progress towards any comprehensive groundwa-
ter legislation.74 
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-99k (1988). 
68 See Wood, supra note 17, at 570. 
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). 
70 See WOOD, supra note 17, at 570. 
71 See PROTECTING THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 74 (citing the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1211, 1221-30a, 1231-
43,1251-79,1281,1291-1309,1311-16,1321-28; the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act 
(UMTRCA); the Hazardous Material Transportation Act (HMTA); the Hazardous Liquid Pipe-
line Safety Act (HLPSA». 
Two other statutes regulate the production of chemical substances: the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92. [d. at 74-75. 
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64, the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84, and the Water Research 
and Development Act of 1978 (WRDA) all contain provisions which can be used for groundwater 
protection. GOLDFARB, supra note 24, at 75. 
72 See ROGERS, supra note 2, at 6. Additionally, the United States has no comprehensive law 
or policy to protect the entirety of the nation's waters. This lack of a federal water policy has 
been referred to as a "policy drought." [d. 
The Western Governors Association commented that: 
raJ principal characteristic of federal water policy is that policies are made in an ad hoc, 
decentralized manner. No agency of the executive branch or committee of Congress is 
responsible for keeping an eye on the "big picture." Thus, federal water policy lacks a 
unifying vision or even a set of guiding principles. 
[d. It has been argued, however, that the cumulative effect of federal laws, agencies, and 
programs do, in sum, constitute a federal water policy. [d. at 7. 
73 [d. at 19. 
74 See id. 
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Other attempts to create a comprehensive federal groundwater 
statute also have failed. For example, the 100th Congress considered 
eighteen groundwater bills that were filed but never passed.75 A meas-
ure finally considered in the House of Representatives, which merely 
addressed groundwater data gathering and research, likewise, was 
never passed.76 One commentator has predicted some form of ground-
water protection to be included in the expected reauthorization of the 
CWA.77 Until such legislation is passed, however, federal groundwater 
protection must consist of the patchwork of protections offered by 
existing federal statutes.78 
D. The Language of the Clean Water Act Pertaining to 
Groundwater and Its Administrative Interpretation 
Congress declared that the objective of the CWA was "to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."79 Whether the CWA governs groundwater, how-
ever, has been the subject of substantial dispute since the CWNs 
inception.so Certain sections of the CWA specifically address ground-
water,8! but it is unclear whether the CWNs pollution control provi-
sions apply to groundwater.82 A brief survey of the CWA provisions 
applicable to groundwater aids in understanding the judicial inclusion 
or exclusion of groundwater jurisdiction under the CWA. 
Some provisions of the CWA clearly apply to groundwater. For 
example, section 102 includes groundwater within its mandate for 
developing comprehensive water pollution control programs.83 Sec-
751d. at 195. 
761d. at 19. 
77 ROGERS, supra note 2, at 195 n.6. 
78 All 50 states also have addressed groundwater protection to some degree and have pro-
grams at various stages of development for groundwater protection. PROTECTING THE NA-
TION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 6. Such programs, however, often are uncoordinated 
with surface water programs and are generally narrowly focused on sources, contaminants, and 
users. ld. at 7. 
79 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
80 See infra notes 141-92, 215-65, 282-315 and accompanying text. 
8! See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
82 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
83 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a). The statute provides: 
[t]he Administrator shall, after careful investigation, and in cooperation with other 
Federal agencies, State water pollution control agencies, interstate agencies, and the 
municipalities and industries involved, prepare or develop comprehensive programs 
for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and 
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tions 208,84 205G),85 104,86 and 10687 provide for regional monitoring and 
planning aimed at both surface waters and groundwaters. Section 201 
authorizes and creates grants for waste treatment management.88 
Sections 201 and 311 both relate to potential sources of groundwater 
contamination.89 Section 304 provides for the development of specific 
water quality criteria, which would include groundwater quality.90 
CWA provisions aimed directly at pollution control, however, con-
tain ambiguous language which mayor may not apply to groundwater. 
Some commentators have argued that underground waters that flow 
into surface waters constitute a "point source,"91 which the CWA 
regulates.92 Advocates of this theory argue that an underground chan-
nel that feeds into surface waters fits the CWA definition of a point 
source.93 Advocates for applying pollution control provisions to ground-
water also argue that Congress would have created a specific exemp-
tion for groundwater if Congress intended to exclude groundwater 
from the definition of a point source.94 
ground waters and improving the sanitary conditions of surface and underground 
waters. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
84 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing areawide waste treatment manage-
ment). 
85 33 U.S.C. § 1285(j) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allotting grants for water quality management 
plans). 
86 33 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This sections provides: 
(a) The Administrator shall establish national programs for the prevention, reduction, 
and elimination of pollution and as part of such programs shall ... 
(5) in cooperation with the States, and their political subdivisions, and other Federal 
agencies establish, equip, and maintain a water quality surveillance system for the 
purpose of monitoring the quality of the navigable waters and ground waters and the 
contiguous zone and the oceans .... 
ld. (emphasis added). 
87 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing grants for state enforcement of 
pollution controls). 
88 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
89 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281, 1321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
90 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
91 The CWA defines a "point source" as: 
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concen-
trated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants 
are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater dis-
charges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
92 Discussion of point source regulation for underground waters is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. For an extensive discussion, see Wood, supra note 17, at 575-86. 
93 See id. at 575. 
94 See id. at 576 (citation omitted). 
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Most attempts to prevent groundwater pollution using the CWA 
have stemmed from the CW Ns National Pollution Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES).95 The CWA prohibits the discharge of any 
pollutants into "navigable waters" except as authorized under an 
NPDES permit or other CWA authority.96 The CWA also prohibits 
the "discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters" 
without a permit.97 The CWA grants authority to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to implement and enforce the permitting 
process98 and grants limited permitting authority to the Chief of the 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).99 The EPA also can authorize 
states themselves to operate their own permitting process. lOO 
A substantial anomaly exists in the NPDES program, however.lOl 
When the EPA is the NPDES permitting authority, the CWA does 
not dictate explicitly whether the permitting program is to apply to 
groundwater.102 Section 402(b)(1)(D),103 in contrast, makes the EPNs 
approval of state NPDES programs contingent upon the state's dem-
onstration of legal authority to "control the disposal of pollutants into 
wells."104 Thus, although the CWA does not clearly require the EPA 
to issue an NPDES permit for discharges into groundwater, states 
are required to issue permits for groundwater discharges in order to 
take over an NPDES program from the EPA.105 
The issue of whether an NPDES permit is required for the dis-
charge of a pollutant into groundwater has given rise to the majority 
of case law regarding the extent of the CW Ns groundwater jurisdic-
95 33 U.s.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
96 33 U.s.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 1342(a)(I) provides: 
[e Jxcept as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Administrator may, after 
opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or 
combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition 
that such discharge meet either (A) all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 
1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary 
implementing actions relating to all such requirement, such conditions as the Admin-
istrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. 
Id. § 1342(a)(I). 
97 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a) (1988). 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
99 33 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (1988). 
100 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
101 PARTHENIA B. EVANS, ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK, 1994 A.B.A. (Sec. 
Nat. Resources, Energy, & Envtl. Law 13). 
102 Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
103 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D). 
104 EVANS, supra note 101, at 13. The EPA's review of state permitting programs for well 
disposal is less stringent than for surface water. See id. 
105 See id. 
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tion.106 Because the NPDES requires a discharger to possess a permit 
for discharge into "navigable waters," litigants have debated whether 
"navigable waters" include groundwater.107 Although in the traditional 
sense groundwater is non-navigable, the CWA does not use the term 
"navigable waters" in that sense. lOS Rather, the CWA adopts a very 
broad interpretation of "navigable waters," defining them as "waters 
of the United States, including the territorial seas."109 Thus, the CWA 
definition of "navigable waters" eliminates any requirement that the 
waters be navigable-in-fact.uo To be protected under the CWA, wa-
ters merely need be "waters of the United States."1l1 
The term "waters of the United States," in turn, has invited a 
variety of interpretations. Administrative interpretations of the term 
have taken a somewhat more limited view than the language im-
plies.u2 In accord with the CWNs statutory authority,113 the EPA and 
the Corps have issued identical regulations defining "waters of the 
United States."114 Both the EPNs and the Corps's regulatory defini-
tion substantially narrow the expansive implications of "waters of the 
United States."115 Although these regulations do not specifically ad-
106 See infra notes 141-92,215-65,282-315 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 141-92,215-65,282-315 and accompanying text. 
108 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The Court in The Daniel Ball found 
that navigable rivers were those rivers which were navigable-in-fact. [d. The Court imposed 
the additional requirement that the water be usable as a highway for commerce between states 
or foreign countries. [d. Thus, courts subsequently referring to navigable waters in the tradi-
tional sense make reference to this navigable-in-fact test of The Daniel Ball. [d. 
109 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988). 
110 See id. 
III See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
112 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1994). 
113 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1988) gives the Administrator ofthe EPA the authority to "prescribe 
such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter." [d. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(c) grants authority to the Corps. 
114 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). 
115 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). The full text of the EPA definition, which is 
identical to the Corps's definition, reads: 
[tlhe term waters afthe United States means: 
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible 
to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the 
ebb and flow of the tide; 
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; 
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent 
streams), mudflats, sand-flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: 
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or 
other purposes; or 
---------
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dress groundwater, the regulations state that "waters of the United 
States" include "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermit-
tent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, 
wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or 
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce."116 
The regulations do not, however, indicate whether this list is exclusive 
or, alternatively, whether this list cites only some of the types of 
waters that will be considered "waters of the United States."1l7 Thus, 
the regulations do not answer definitively whether groundwater should 
be considered "waters of the United States."118 
E. Legislative History Regarding Groundwater 
and the Clean Water Act 
In CWA groundwater cases, courts often examine the legislative 
history of the CWA to determine whether Congress intended to in-
clude groundwater within the definition of "navigable waters."119 The 
most frequently cited portion of this legislative history comes from 
the report of the Senate Committee on Public Works (Committee) on 
the CW Pis applicability to groundwater which states, "[S]everal bills 
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or 
foreign commerce; or 
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in 
interstate commerce; 
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under 
this definition; 
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (s)(I) through (4) of this section; 
(6) The territorial sea; 
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) 
identified in paragraphs (s)(I) through (6) of this section; waste treatment systems, 
including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA 
(other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria 
of this definition) are not waters ofthe United States. 
Waters of the United States do not include prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding 
the determination of an area's status as prior converted cropland by any other federal 
agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction remains with the EPA. 
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3). 
116 [d.; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). 
117 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a). 
118 This Comment and relevant case law frequently use the terms "navigable waters" and 
"waters of the United States." When "navigable waters" is used in this Comment, it carries this 
broad, "waters of the United States" meaning, not the traditional, navigable-in-fact meaning. 
119 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1325-29 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. GAF 
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (S.D. Tex. 1975). 
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pending before the Committee provided authority to establish Fed-
erally approved standards for groundwaters which permeate rock, 
soil, and other subsurface formations. Because the jurisdiction re-
garding groundwaters is so complex and varied from State to State, 
the Committee did not adopt this recommendation."12o The Committee 
recognizes the essential link between groundwater and surface wa-
ters and the artificial nature of any distinction. Thus the Committee 
bill requires in section 402 that each state include in its program for 
approval under section 402 affirmative controls over the injection or 
placement in wells of any pollutants that may affect groundwater. 
This scheme is designed to protect groundwaters and to eliminate the 
use of deep well disposal as an uncontrolled alternative to toxic and 
pollution disposaU21 Courts deciding that groundwater is not "navi-
gable water" cite to this passage as evidence that Congress acknow-
ledged the impracticability of creating federal legislation to control 
groundwater pollution when rules governing groundwater substan-
tially vary from state to state.l22 
In the House debate on the matter, Representative Les Aspin (D. 
Wisc.) advocated explicit groundwater protections.l23 In support of his 
amendment to bring groundwater within the permit provision of Title 
IV (NPDES), Representative Aspin pronounced: 
the amendment brings ground water into the subject of the bill, 
into the enforcement of the bill. Ground water appears, in this bill 
in every section, in every title except title IV. It is under the title 
which provides EPA can study ground water. It is under the title 
dealing with definitions. But when it comes to enforcement, title 
IV, the section on permits and licenses, then ground water is 
suddenly missing. That is a glaring inconsistency which has no 
point. If we do not stop pollution of ground waters through seep-
age and other means, ground water gets into navigable waters, 
120 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3739 
121 [d. 
122 See, e.g., Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1325. 
123 Representative Aspin (D. Wisc.) recommendedthat the term "ground waters" should be 
included in the term "navigable waters." Hearings on H.R. 11896 et al. before the House 
Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 728 [hereinafter LEG. 
HIST.]. This would allow groundwater pollution to be regulated in the same manner as other 
water resources under the CWA. [d. Representative Aspin noted that sections 401 and 402 used 
the term "navigable waters," but failed to mention specifically groundwater. [d. at 127. He noted 
that groundwater specifically was mentioned in the other four titles of the bill, but was inexpli-
cably lacking from title IV. [d. 
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and to control only navigable waters and not the ground water 
makes no sense at all. l24 
617 
Opponents of the Aspin Amendment argued that Congress deter-
mined that there was not sufficient information on groundwater to 
justify the types of controls proposed for "navigable waters."125 After 
some debate, the House defeated the Aspin Amendment by a vote of 
86 to 34.126 
The Aspin Amendment, however, did not have the sole purpose of 
expressly mentioning groundwater in Title IV.127 The Aspin Amend-
ment also would have deleted exemptions for oil and gas well injec-
tions.128 Several commentators have suggested that the oil and gas 
provisions rather than the inclusion of groundwater caused the Aspin 
Amendment's demise.129 Furthermore, members of Congress simply 
may have assumed that groundwater was implicitly included in the 
definition of "navigable waters" in section 402, making the Aspin 
Amendment unnecessary.130 Thus, the defeat of the Aspin Amend-
124 118 CONGo REC. 10,666 (1972), reprinted in LEG. RIST., supra note 123, at 589 (remarks of 
Rep. Aspin). 
125 For example, Representative Clausen stated that not enough is known about groundwater 
to require such controls. Id. at 590-91 (remarks of Rep. Clausen (R. Cal.)). For other comments 
from the congressional debate, see id. at 596-97. 
126Id. at 597. 
127 Wood, supra note 17, at 613-14. 
128 See LEG. RIST., supra note 123, at 589; United States Steel Corp. V. Train, 566 F.2d 822, 
853 n.66 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Wood, supra note 17, at 613-14. 
129 See Wood, supra note 17, at 614 n.228 ("Since [inclusion of groundwater and elimination of 
the oil and gas exemption] were muddled in the debate, the rejection of the amendment does 
not necessarily indicate Congress's unwillingness to exempt all groundwater from federal regu-
lation."); Alan W. Eckert, EPA Jurisdiction Over Well Injection Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 9 NAT. RESOURCES L. 455, 457 (1976) ("[T]he tenacity of support for the 
'oil and gas' exclusion ... suggests that the opposition to the Aspin Amendment may have been 
primarily from the attempted tampering with that exclusion."); Note, United States V. GAF 
Corp.: A Leak in the FWPCA?, 6 ENVTL. L. 561, 564 n.23 (proposed elimination of oil and gas 
exemption "probably had a great deal to do with [the Aspin Amendment's] defeat"). 
130 One commentator notes: 
[t]hough it is puzzling that section 402 does not refer to groundwater when other 
sections make simultaneous reference to groundwater and navigable water, this does 
not mean that all groundwater, or even some, falls outside section 402. First, section 
402 does refer to wells, if not groundwater per se. By authorizing the states to control 
the disposal of pollutants into wells and by granting the federal government equivalent 
power, [footnote omitted] this section strongly suggests that groundwater is subject 
to federal regulation. 
Even if these other provisions indicate a legislative distinction between "ground-
waters" and "navigable waters," it does not necessarily follow that tributary ground-
water is excluded from regulation. Tributary groundwater is encompassed by the 
reference to navigable water .... The mention of groundwater in the other sections 
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ment does not necessarily imply that Congress had decided explicitly 
to exclude groundwater from the scope of Title IV. 
The CWNs legislative history thus appears inconclusive on the 
intent of Congress in not expressly including groundwater in the 
definition of navigable waters. If the oil and gas exclusions had not 
been present in the Aspin Amendment, the Amendment's defeat may 
have revealed Congress's intent to exclude groundwater from the 
CWNs reach. Given the dual purpose of the Aspin Amendment, how-
ever, the Amendment's defeat cannot conclusively demonstrate Con-
gress's intent to exclude groundwater. 
There is no clear answer as to whether the CWA jurisdiction in-
cludes groundwater. The language of the CWA, the administrative 
interpretations of the language, and the CW Ns legislative history are 
all inconclusive. Thus, the courts, in attempting to resolve the ques-
tion, have adopted varying interpretations of the CWA language, 
administrative interpretations, and legislative history with predict-
ably incongruous results. 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GROUNDWATER As 
"NAVIGABLE WATERS" UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
There are now more than two decades worth of cases interpreting 
the meaning of "navigable waters" under the CWA. Courts have used 
a variety of approaches to the problem, focusing on the language of 
the CWA, the overarching goals of the CWA, the EPNs and the 
Corps's regulations, and the CWNs legislative history.l3l The cases 
addressed in this section discuss whether groundwater is part of 
"navigable waters" and whether certain surface waters should be 
included in the definition of "navigable waters."132 The analysis used 
to determine whether a discharge into groundwater is a violation of 
the CWA frequently mirrors the analysis courts use to decide whether 
a discharge into surface waters is prohibited.133 Many of the ground-
of the Act could simply refer to isolated, nontributary groundwater. The legislative 
comments are simply inconclusive. 
Wood, supra note 17, at 614-15. 
131 See, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) (focusing 
primarily on the broad intent of the CWA); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1325-29 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (focusing primarily on the legislative history). 
132 See supra note 115. 
133 See, e.g., Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374-75 (discussing whether surface water is navigable 
water); United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(discussing whether a tributary of a "navigable water" is itself "navigable water"). 
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water cases cite to the surface water cases and analogize to their 
comparable factual situations.134 
A. Case Law Development and Theory 
1. Groundwater as "Navigable Waters:" General Judicial 
Approaches 
Courts generally have excluded nontributary groundwater from 
the CW Ns definition of "navigable waters."135 Case law on the appli-
cability of the CWA to groundwater is generally divided, however, 
when the underground water is alleged to be a tributary of a surface 
body of water that meets the definition of "navigable waters."136 
The first major case addressing the scope of "navigable waters" was 
United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., decided in 
1974.137 Ashland did not deal with groundwater; rather, Ashland ad-
dressed whether "navigable waters" encompassed a non-navigable 
tributary of a navigable river.13B The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit focused on the definition of "navigable waters" 
as "waters of the United States," concluding that the term applied to 
all bodies of water, including tributaries.139 The court observed that 
the CWA would be a mockery if Congress's "authority to control 
pollution was limited to the bed of the navigable steam itself. The 
tributaries of the river could then be used as open sewers as far as 
federal regulation was concerned."140 For the Ashland court, the an-
swer was clear: "[p]ollution control of navigable streams can only be 
exercised by controlling pollution of their tributaries."141 Thus, the 
Ashland court acknowledged the broad, new meaning of "navigable 
waters" and extended the term well beyond its traditional meaning.142 
134 See, e.g., Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 964-65 (7th 
Cir.), cen. denied, 115 S. Ct. 322 (1994); Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 
1433-34 (D. Colo. 1993), appeal dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994). 
135 See, e.g., Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1330; McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 
1182, 1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 
136 See infra notes 137-91 and accompanying text. 
137 Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1318. 
138 See id. 
139 [d. at 1325. 
140 [d. at 1326. 
141 [d. at 1327 (emphasis added). 
142 See Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1326. 
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While Ashland dealt with tributary surface waters,143 cases ac-
knowledging the tributary versus nontributary groundwater distinc-
tion also emerged shortly after the CWNs enactment. United States 
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., for example, recognized tributary groundwa-
ter jurisdiction under the CWA.144 In that case, the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona looked to the legislative 
intent behind the CWA and concluded that Congress enacted the 
CWA "to eliminate or to reduce as much as possible all water pollu-
tion throughout the United States both surface and underground."145 
The court recognized the broad scope of "navigable waters" under the 
CWA: "control must extend to all pollutants which are discharged into 
any waterway, including normally dry arroyos,146 where any water 
which might flow therein could reasonably end up in any body of 
water, to which or in which there is some public interest, including 
underground waters."147 The court concluded that the definition of 
"navigable waters" or "waters of the United States" includes any 
waterway through which water may flow into public waters.148 Tribu-
tary groundwater fits squarely within this definition.149 The court thus 
focused on the final destination of the pollution, not the above- or 
below-ground locus of the conduit. 
In other early cases courts also excluded nontributary groundwater 
from the CWA150 but were hesitant to decide tributary groundwater's 
status. l5l United States v. GAF Corp., for example, addressed a cor-
poration's failure to obtain appropriate EPA permits for two deep 
wells it was drilling for the disposal of organic chemical wastes.152 The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ad-
dressed whether or not the CWA applied to subsurface wells.153 The 
court concluded that the disposal of wastes into "underground waters 
143 See id. 
144 See United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
145 [d. 
146 An arroyo is a "small steep-sided watercourse or gulch with a nearly flat floor: usually dry 
except after heavy rains." RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 76 (revised ed. 1984). 
147 Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1187 (second emphasis added). 
148 [d. 
149 See id. Kentucky v. Train similarly viewed the CWA as applying to tributary groundwater. 
9 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1280, 1282 (E.D. Ky. 1976). Kentucky v. Train found that the CWA 
granted authority over all "waters of the United States," which include "any subsurface waters 
having a clear hydrological nexus with ... waters of the United States .... " [d. 
150 See United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975). 
151 See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 
152 See GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1380. 
153 [d. at 1383. 
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which have not been alleged to flow into or otherwise affect surface 
waters does not constitute a 'discharge of a pollutant' .... "154 The 
court inquired into the legislative history surrounding the CWA 155 and 
concluded that Congress clearly did not authorize regulation of such 
disposal wells.156 Thus, the GAF court's holding excluded nontributary 
groundwater from the CWA, but the court did not address whether 
or not tributary groundwater was covered.157 By noting that the wa-
ters in question where not alleged to flow into surface waters, how-
ever, the court suggested that tributary and nontributary groundwa-
ter were subject to different treatment under the CWA.I58 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
acknowledged the possibility of different treatment for tributary and 
nontributary groundwater under the CWA in Exxon Corp. v. Train. 
However, that court also refrained from deciding whether tributary 
groundwater constituted "navigable waters."159 In Exxon, the EPA 
attempted to assert its authority to regulate a corporation's disposal 
of waste water into former oil wells approximately 5,000 feet deep.l60 
The corporation challenged the EPA's authority to regulate such sub-
surface disposal under the CWA.161 Relying on an extensive inquiry 
into different sections of the CWA and its legislative history,l62 the 
court agreed with Exxon that the CWA did not grant the EPA the 
authority to regulate such disposals.163 The Exxon court, like the 
United States v. GAF court, expressly limited its holding to nontribu-
tary groundwater: "[s]pecifically, EPA has not argued that the wastes 
disposed of into wells here do, or might, 'migrate' from ground waters 
back into surface waters that concededly are within its regulatory 
jurisdiction .... We mean to express no opinion on what the result 
would be if that were the state of facts."I64 Thus, while the court 
164 [d. (emphasis added); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating "[e]xcept as in 
compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."). 
165 GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1386. 
156 [d. at 1384-85. 
157 See id. at 1383. 
158 See id. 
169 Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 
160 [d. at 1313. 
161 [d. at 1314. 
162 [d. at 1317-29. 
163 [d. at 1330; United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975). 
164 Exxon Corp., 554 F.2d at 1312 n.1. 
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concluded that nontributary groundwater was outside the scope of 
the CWA, the tributary groundwater issue remained unanswered.165 
Although Exxon did not resolve the tributary groundwater issue, 
later cases have used Exxon both to support and undermine tributary 
groundwater inclusion under the CWA. In Kelley v. United States 
(Kelley 1)/66 for example, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan maintained a citizen suit under the CWA 167 
for the discharge of toxic chemicals into groundwater.l68 Noting that 
the discharge was alleged ultimately to affect surface waters, the 
court concluded that: 
the Fifth Circuit concedes that wastes which migrate from ground-
waters back into surface waters are within the EPA's regulatory 
jurisdiction. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d [at 1312 n.1.]. This 
Court believes that the type of pollution of "navigable waters" 
which plaintiff complains of in the instant case is encompassed by 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act .... "169 
Thus, although the Exxon opinion clearly stated that the court 
expressed no opinion on tributary groundwater jurisdiction under the 
165 Id. Other courts have followed the Exxon and GAF example by not directly deciding the 
tributary groundwater issue. New York v. United States, for example, addressed the chemical 
contamination of groundwater below a former air force base and the surrounding area. 620 F. 
Supp. 374, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The defendant argued that the CWA did not apply to discharges 
into groundwater, but only to pollution of navigable waterways. Id. at 381. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York declined to reach the defendant's argument 
because "it is clear that plaintiff has alleged that the pollutants threaten to contaminate ... 
undisputably navigable waters." Id. Thus, the New York court avoided ruling on the groundwa-
ter issue. Id. 
In 1bwn of Norfolk v. United States Corps of Engineers, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit deferred to the Corps's judgment and concluded that the CWA did not 
cover tributary groundwater. 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir. 1992). Norfolk addressed the Corps's 
attempts to construct a landfill. Id. at 1442. One of plaintiffs arguments was that the Corps 
failed to consider the possible impacts of the landfill on groundwater. Id. at 1450-51. The court 
stated that while the Corps's definition of groundwater does not address specifically whether 
groundwater is a part of "waters of the United States," the Corps has interpreted the definition 
to apply only to surface water. Id. at 1450. The First Circuit acknowledged that other courts 
have questioned whether groundwater should be covered if hydrologically connected to surface 
waters. Id. at 1451 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990); McClellan 
Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 1988)). The court 
concluded, however, that because the determination involved an ecological judgment about the 
relationship between surface waters and groundwaters, the determination should be left to the 
EPA and the Corps. Noifolk, 968 F.2d at 1451. 
166 Kelley I, No. 79-10199 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1980). 
167 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988 & Supp. v 1993) (authorizing citizens suits). 
168 Kelley I, No. 79-10199, slip op. at 2. 
169 Id. at 3. 
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CWA,170 Kelley I interpreted Exxon as including tributary ground-
waters within the EPA's jurisdiction.171 
A second, unrelated case, Kelley v. United States, (Kelley II) reached 
the opposite conclusion.l72 Relying heavily on Exxon, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that ground-
water was not a part of the "waters of the United States."173 The 
plaintiffs alleged that toxic chemicals had been released into the ground 
at the United States Coast Guard Station in Traverse City, Michi-
gan.174 These chemicals contaminated groundwater and traveled through 
the groundwater towards the town and eventually into surface wa-
ters.175 Defendants maintained that Congress did not intend for the 
CWA to cover groundwater because no mention of groundwater was 
made in most of the statutory provisions, including section 301(a).176 
The court delved into the CWA's legislative history and agreed with 
the defendants' interpretation of the statute.177 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that Kelley I had misinterpreted Exxon Corp. v. Train. 178 
The court in Kelley II explained that the Exxon decision did not 
concede that contaminated groundwater that eventually migrates into 
"navigable waters" is subject to the regulatory provisions of the 
CWA, but Kelley II stated that the Exxon case rather "express[ed] 
no opinion on what the result would be [under the CWA] if that were 
the state of facts."179 Kelly II thus concluded that the remainder of 
the Exxon opinion and the "unmistakably clear legislative history" 
demonstrated that' Congress did not intend to exert its authority over 
groundwater in the CWA.l80 
Some courts have held that the potential for groundwater to be 
tributary to surface waters may be enough to bring groundwater 
within the scope of the CWA. In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situ-
ation v. Weinberger, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California held that Congress did not intend to require 
170 Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 
171 See Kelley I, 79--10199, slip op. at 3; see also ExxCYn, 554 F.2d at 1312 n.!. 
172 Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985). 
173 See id.; see also ExxCYn, 554 F.2d at 1312 n.!. 
174 Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. at 1104. 
175 Id. at 1105. 
176 Id. Section 301(a) makes discharge of any pollution illegal if not made in compliance with 
the provisions of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988). 
177 Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. at 1105--06. 
178 Id. at 1106; see Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977). 
179 Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. at 1107 (citing ExxCYn, 554 F.2d at 1312 n.1). 
ISO Id. 
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NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants to isolated groundwa-
ter.l8l The court also concluded, however, that permits might be re-
quired for discharges into groundwater that has a direct hydrological 
connection to surface waters that themselves constitute "navigable 
waters."l82 The court placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff, stat-
ing that the CWA claim would succeed only if the plaintiff could prove 
the existence of a natural connection between the groundwater and 
surface waters.l83 
After additional discovery, the court denied the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situ-
ation v. Cheney.l84 The additional evidence showed that the waste pits 
did not discharge pollutants through the groundwater into "navigable 
waters."l85 Heavy pumping of groundwater caused groundwater in 
the area to move away from nearby "navigable waters."l86 Hydrologic 
experts for both sides agreed that without heavy pumping, the ground-
water would move towards the surface waters.l87 The court indicated 
that it was not prepared to rule that the groundwater was outside of 
the scope of the CWA just because the groundwater was not pres-
ently migrating into "navigable waters."l88 The court stated: 
this court is very much concerned that if it were to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Government at this time, it might 
inadvertently send out a signal that even where there is a natural 
hydrological connection between groundwater and surface wa-
ters, a manmade or artificially created process that temporarily 
interrupts that hydrological connection can serve to negate the 
permitting requirements of the Clean Water Act.l89 
The court thus concluded that it was necessary to determine whether 
the seepage had a "reasonably foreseeable and temporally imminent 
effect on surface waters of the United States."l90 Accordingly, the 
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.l9l 
181 McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 
1988). 
182 [d. 
183 See id. 
184 763 F. Supp. 431, 438 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
185 See id. at 437. 
186 [d. 
187 [d. 
188 [d. 
189 McClellan, 763 F. Supp. at 437. 
190 [d. 
191 [d. at 438. 
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Thus, judicial approaches to groundwater under the CWA have 
been far from uniform.l92 The only consensus reached among the courts 
has been that the CWA does not cover nontributary groundwater.193 
2. Wetlands as "Navigable Waters" 
"Navigable waters" under the CWA frequently are discussed in 
cases addressing wetlands. As in CWA groundwater cases, courts in 
CWA wetlands cases must determine the extent of "navigable wa-
ters." CWA wetlands cases frequently engage in a similar analysis of 
"navigable waters," examining the CWA language, intent, legislative 
history, and regulations. The reasoning used in the wetlands cases is 
thus directly analogous to groundwater cases. 
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that, based on the broad intent of 
the CWA, wetlands are "waters of the United States."194 The Court 
acknowledged CWA jurisdiction over wetlands and specifically ad-
dressed the Corps's definition of wetlands.195 While noting that wet-
lands are not appropriately categorized as either "waters" or "lands," 
the Court concluded that the broad goal of the CWA to combat pollu-
tion of the nation's waters required the inclusion of wetlands under 
the CWA.l96 Including wetlands promotes this goal because wetlands 
often filter and purify water that drains into adjacent water bodies.197 
The Court determined that the Corps's definition of wetlands relied 
on the fact that there are ecological and groundwater connections 
between wetlands and "navigable waters."l98 
In Deltona Corp. v. United States, the United States Court of 
Claims accepted the Corps's view that adjacent wetlands were "navi-
192 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); McClellan Ecological 
Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 
193 Compare Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (excluding tributary ground-
water from the CWA) with Kelley I, No. 79-10199, slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1980) 
(including tributary groundwater within the CWA); see supra notes 164-78 and accompanying 
text. 
194 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). For an extensive 
discussion of Riverside, see generally Guy V. Manning, The Extent of Groundwater Jurisdiction 
Under the Clean Water Act After Riverside Bayview Homes, 47 LA. L. REV. 859 (1987). 
195 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-33. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 134. Such reasoning also supports applying the CWA to groundwater because it 
serves many of the same environmentally stabilizing functions as groundwater. See PROTECTING 
THE NATION'S GROUNDWATER, supra note 5, at 5. 
198 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134--35. 
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gable waters" that should receive the benefit of CWA protections.l99 
The court looked to Congress's language in defining "navigable wa-
ters" as "waters of the United States" and determined that Congress 
intended this language to be interpreted broadly.2°O "In other words, 
the intent was to cover, as much as possible, all waters of the United 
States instead of just some."201 
CWA wetlands cases are thus very similar to CWA groundwater 
cases. In wetlands cases, courts determine whether wetlands should 
be considered "navigable waters" and look to the intent of the CWA 
when making this determination. Many CWA groundwater cases util-
ize this same approach.202 The wetlands cases provide another exam-
ple of how courts have focused on the intent of the CWA to interpret 
"navigable waters" broadly.203 
B. The Seventh Circuit Approach 
1. Case Law Development 
The interpretation of the CWA adopted by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit represents the evolution of that 
circuit's approach to "navigable waters" under the CWA. In both 
wetlands and groundwater cases, the Seventh Circuit began with a 
broad interpretation of "navigable waters," but recently has articu-
lated a more constricted view of the term. 
United States v. Byrd demonstrates the Seventh Circuit's initially 
broad interpretation of "navigable waters" in the wetlands context.204 
Byrd addressed the defendant's filling of wetlands without appropri-
ate Corps permits.205 The court determined that "navigable waters" 
comprise all waters within the confines of the United States and thus 
include wetlands.206 The Byrd court focused on the broad intent of 
199 See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186 (Cl. Ct. 1981). 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 See, e.g., McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 
(E.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985); 
Deltorw" 657 F.2d at 1186-87. 
204 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979). 
205 [d. at 1206. 
206 [d. at 1209 (citing United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1317 (6th Cir. 
1974». 
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the CWA when interpreting "navigable waters" and determined that 
"navigable waters" included wetlands.207 
More recently, Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator addressed 
whether a developer's act of filling certain wetlands required an NPDES 
permit.208 The parties conceded that the area in question-a small 
one-acre wetland not directly connected to any other body of water-
was categorized properly as a wetland.209 Petitioner, Hoffman Homes, 
however, argued that the CWA did not reach this type of small, 
isolated wetland.210 The court looked to the EPA's definition of "wa-
ters of the United States," and determined that the use of the word 
"could"211 indicated that waters with merely potential connections to 
interstate commerce were covered.212 Despite this seemingly expan-
sive interpretation of the EPA regulation, the court determined that 
the wetland was not covered by the CWA because the Corps failed to 
prove that migratory birds stopped at the wetland, and therefore the 
requisite connection to interstate commerce was lacking.213 This opin-
ion narrows the expansive interpretation of United States v. Byrd by 
requiring a specific connection between the water body and interstate 
commerce.214 
United States Steel Corp. v. Train was the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's first major case on the issue of 
groundwater as "navigable waters," and the court adopted a broad 
interpretation of the CWA.215 Train involved a challenge to an NPDES 
permit that limited the United States Steel Corporation's (U.S. Steel) 
disposal of pollutants into deep wells.216 Citing United States v. GAF 
COrp.217 and the legislative history of the CWA, U.S. Steel argued that 
207 See Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1209. 
208 Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, 999 F.2d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1993). 
209 [d. at 258, 260. 
210 See id. 
211 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). "Could" is used repeatedly in the regu-
lation, referring to waters which "are or could be" used by interstate travelers, or to waters 
"from which shellfish are or could be taken." See supra note 115. 
212 Hoffman, 260 F.2d at 261. 
213 See id. at 261-S2. The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Manion agreed that the CWA 
did not cover the area in question. [d. at 262 (Manion, J. concurring). Judge Manion stated that 
regulation of isolated wetlands does not further the CWPis intent and stated that the CWA 
would not apply even if the Commerce Clause allowed isolated wetland regulation. [d. at 263 
(Manion, J. concurring). Thus, isolated wetlands should not fall within CWA jurisdiction. See id. 
214 See id. at 261-S2; see generally United States v. Byrd, 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
215 See United States Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977). 
216 See id. at 851-52. 
217 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text. 
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the EPA had no authority to control such disposal.218 The court dis-
agreed, stating "[the CWA] authorizes EPA to regulate the disposal 
of pollutants into deep wells, at least when the regulation is under-
taken in conjunction with limitations on the permittee's discharges 
into surface waters."219 
U.S. Steel argued that the deep wells were not connected to surface 
waters.220 The court, however, stated that the EPA could have con-
cluded "that too little is known about the effects of discharges into 
ground waters to justify allowing increases in them."221 The court also 
rejected the United States v. GAF Corp. court's view that the legis-
lative history, particularly the defeat of the Aspin Amendment, indi-
cated that the EPA did not have authority over deep well injections.222 
The court noted that the amendment's oil and gas exclusion had led 
to the amendment's defeat, and this defeat should not be interpreted 
to exclude groundwater from the CWA.223 
In 1990, the Seventh Circuit again addressed groundwater jurisdic-
tion under the CWA in Inland Steel Co. v. EPA.224 Inland addressed 
deep disposal wells that clearly were not connected hydrologically to 
navigable waters.225 The court found that the CWA was intended to 
protect navigable waters and that injection of waste more than a 
quarter mile below the deepest known aquifer was not a discharge 
into navigable waters.226 The court next proposed three possible ef-
fects of the disposal of pollutants through deep injection wells.227 First, 
a well might end in "navigable waters," but the court dismissed this 
218 u.s. Steel, 556 F.2d at 851-52. 
219Id. at 852. The court independently concluded that the legislative history supported its 
interpretation of the statute. Id. The court cited Senator Muskie (D. Maine), who stated: "The 
Conferees intend that this provision [§ 502(6)(B)] assure that no injection or disposal occur in 
such a manner as to present a potential hazard to ground water quality." Id. The court also cited 
statements by Representative Kemp: "[fJor the first time ground waters have been give the 
same emphasis as surface waters ... [the CWA is] an important step forward in the protection 
of the underground environment .... " Id. at 852-53. 
220 See id. at 852 n.61. 
221Id. 
222 Id. at 853 n.66; see supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
223 U.S. Steel, 556 F.2d at 853 n.66; see supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
224 901 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (7th Cir. 1990). 
225 Id. at 1420. 
226Id. at 1422. The court in Inland did not enclose navigable waters in quotations as other 
courts consistently have done. Other courts apparently set the term off in quotes to highlight 
the fact that "navigable waters" refers to a statutory definition and not waters that are 
navigable-in-fact. The Inland court's failure to do so may mean that it is using navigable waters 
in this traditional, navigable-in-fact sense. 
227Id. at 1422-23. 
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possibility since the wells in question did not.228 Second, a well con-
nected to surface waters through groundwaters might be subject to 
regulation under the CWA.229 Third, waters leaking through the upper 
casing of a well could pollute navigable waters directly, without the 
conduit of groundwater.23o The court noted that the EPA believed that 
this possibility was too tenuous to subject deep injection wells to 
CWA jurisdiction.231 
The court referred to its declaration in United States Steel Corp. v. 
Train that too little was known about deep injection wells to require 
the EPA to disregard the possibility that wastes discharged into these 
wells could find their way into "navigable waters."232 Inland thus 
acknowledged the possibility that deep well disposal might be regu-
lated under the CWA if the waters at the bottom of these wells were 
connected to surface waters.233 The court declined, however, to rule 
on this issue because the wells in question were not so connected.234 
2. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp. 
In 1994, in the case of Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton 
Hudson Corp., the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue of whether the 
CW.lts provisions applied to tributary groundwater.235 The court held 
that the CWA did not prevent discharges into groundwater from an 
artificial retention pond despite the possibility of a hydrological con-
nection between the ground and surface waters.236 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court relied on case law, the language and legislative 
history of the CWA, and the EP.lts regulatory definition of "waters of 
the United States."237 
The defendant, Dayton Hudson Corporation (Dayton Hudson), owned 
Target Stores, a retail chain that was constructing an nO-acre distri-
bution warehouse facility in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin.238 Dayton Hud-
228 Id. at 1422. 
229 Inland, 901 F.2d at 1422-23. The court noted that this is an unresolved question that it did 
not need to decide because the wells here were not connected to surface waters. Id. 
230 Id. at 1423. 
231Id. 
232 Id. (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 n.61 (7th Cir. 1977». 
233 Id. at 1422-23. 
234 See Inland, 901 F.2d at 1422-23. 
235 See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.), een. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994). 
236 See id. at 965-66. 
237Id. 
238 Id. at 963-64. 
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son designed a six-acre artificial retention pond to collect the rain-
water runoff from the facility, which included twenty-five acres of 
paved parking.239 The trucks used to transport goods to and from the 
warehouse naturally would drip oil on the parking lot, and this oil 
would collect in the pond along with storm water runoff.240 The pond 
was designed to retain oil and other pollutants while "exftltrating" the 
water into the ground.241 
The Village of Oconomowoc Lake (Village), a nearby municipality, 
feared that the retention pond would allow hydrocarbons and other 
pollutants to contaminate the Village's groundwater.242 The Village thus 
attempted to prevent the construction by alleging violations of the 
Clean Air Act243 and the CWA because the necessary permits were not 
obtained.244 Specifically, the Village claimed that construction of the 
warehouse facility required an NPDES permit because the defendant 
intended to discharge runoff from the retention pond into the ground-
water that would migrate into nearby surface waters and wetlands.245 
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, Dayton Hudson claimed that the Village had failed to state 
a CWA claim because the storm water would only discharge into 
groundwater, which is not included in the definition of "waters of 
the United States."246 The district court agreed with this argument, 
finding support in Kelley II, which held that the CWA did not cover 
groundwater contamination.247 The district court rejected the Village's 
attempt to distinguish Kelley II by arguing that the polluted storm 
water would migrate into nearby wetlands and surface waters.248 The 
court found that Kelley Irs facts were very similar to the instant 
case because the plaintiffs in Kelley II also had alleged that polluted 
groundwater would migrate into surface waters.249 The court found 
239 [d. at 964. 
240 Oconomawoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 963. 
241 [d. at 964. 
242 [d. at 963. 
243 [d. The Clean Air Act claim was dismissed because "vehicular emissions are not attributed 
to the buildings served as points of origin or destination." [d. at 964. 
244 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., No. CIV.A.93-C-0797, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20058, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sep. 24, 1993), affirmed, 24 F.3d 962, eert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
322 (1994). 
245 [d. at *9. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at *9-*10 (citing Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1105--07 (W.D. Mich. 1985»; see supra 
notes 170-78 and accompanying text. 
248 Oeonomawoc, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20058, at *10. 
249 [d. 
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that the decision in Kelley II supported its conclusion that "[t]he fact 
that groundwater pollution will eventually migrate into waters of the 
United States does not, therefore, bring such pollution within the 
terms of the CWA."250 Thus, the district court dismissed the CWA 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.251 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affir-
med the district court's holding.252 The circuit court, like the district 
court, identified the main issue in the case as the scope of the term 
"waters of the United States."253 Although the court acknowledged 
that the CWA is a broad statute that may reach waters that are not 
navigable, the court noted that the CWA does not impose federal 
authority over every drop of water.254 
Additionally, the circuit court focused on the EP A:s regulatory defini-
tion of "waters of the United States."255 The court observed that the 
proposed pond would be artificial while the EP A:s definition speaks 
only of "natural" ponds.256 The court declared that the EPA:s definition 
of "waters of the United States" would not even cover a one-acre 
wetland 750 feet from a small creek.257 Thus, the court concluded that 
an artificial retention pond farther from surface waters could not 
possibly fall within the CWA:s jurisdiction.258 Although the EPA has 
noted the potential connection between underground waters and sur-
face waters,259 the court stated that "collateral reference to a problem 
is not a satisfactory substitute for focused attention in rule-making or 
adjudication."26o 
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the legislative history of 
the CWA demonstrated that the omission of groundwater from the 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at *1-*2. 
252 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994). 
253 See id. at 963. 
254 I d. at 964--U5. The court makes reference to Justice Story's view that every drop of water 
is subject to federal regulation, noting that "'It was said of the late Justice Story, that if a bucket 
of water were brought into his court with a corn cob floating in it, he would at once extend the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States over it.''' Id. at 965 (citing Note, 37 AM. L. REV. 911, 
916 (1903)). 
255 Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965. 
256 Id.; see also supra note 115. 
257 Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965 (citing Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, 999 F.2d 256, 
26~1 (7th Cir. 1993)); see supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. 
258 I d. at 965. 
259 Id. at 965--U6 (citation omitted). 
260 I d. at 966. 
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scope of the CWA was intentional rather than an oversight.261 The 
court noted that Congress had proposed adding groundwater to the 
scope of the CWA, but that such proposals were consistently de-
feated.262 The court also noted the oft-cited statement from the Senate 
Committee on Public Works, disfavoring CWA authority over ground-
water "[b]ecause the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so com-
plex and varied from State to State."263 The court concluded that "[a]s 
the statute and regulations stand, however, the federal government 
has not asserted a claim of authority over artificial ponds that drain 
into ground waters."264 
Oconomowoc thus solidified the Seventh Circuit's restrictive ap-
proach to groundwater under the CWA. While United States Steel 
Corp. v. Train and Inland Steel Co. v. EPA left the tributary ground-
water issue unresolved,265 Oconomowoc excluded even tributary ground-
water from the CWA.266 
C. The Tenth Circuit's Approach 
1. Case Law Development 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also has 
addressed the extent of "navigable waters" under the CWA. Unlike 
the Seventh Circuit, however, the Tenth Circuit consistently has in-
terpreted "navigable waters" broadly. 
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc. addressed a gold-leaching 
operation that discharged toxic solutions containing cyanide into the 
Rito Seco Creek.267 The court examined whether the Rito Seco was a 
"navigable water" under the CWA.268 The court stated that "[i]t seems 
clear Congress intended to regulate discharges made into every creek, 
stream, river or body of water that in any way may affect interstate 
commerce. Every court to discuss the issue has used a commerce 
power approach and agreed upon that interpretation."269 The court 
261 [d. at 965; see also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
262 Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965. 
263 [d. (citing S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668, 3739); see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
264 Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 966. 
265 See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990); United States 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977). 
266 Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965. 
267 United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 370-71 (10th Cir. 1979). 
268 [d. at 373-75. 
269 [d. at 375 (emphasis added). 
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cited the legislative history of the CWA from the Senate, which stated 
that waters of the United States should "be given the broadest pos-
sible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determi-
nations which have been made or may be made for administrative 
purposes."270 The court adopted this broad interpretation of the CWA 
and "navigable waters" and thus held that the CWA applied to a creek 
that was not navigable-in-fact.271 
Shortly after the Earth Sciences decision, the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed "navigable waters" again in United States v. Texas Pipe Line 
CO.272 In that case, the court considered discharges from an oil pipeline 
into a sporadically flowing tributary of the Red River.273 Here, the 
court followed the reasoning of Earth Sciences and held that there 
was a discharge into a "navigable water."274 Even though the tributary 
barely was flowing at the time of the discharge, the court determined 
that the discharge would flow into the Red River during a significant 
rainfall.275 The court again based its holding on its perception of the 
intent of the CWA-to "cover all tributaries to waters like the Red 
River."276 
Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA continued the Tenth 
Circuit's broad interpretation of the CWA.277 Quivira Mining Company 
(Quivira) discharged pollutants into Arroyo del Puerto and San Mateo 
Creek in New Mexico.278 Quivira argued that these discharges fell 
outside the jurisdiction of the CWA because the creek and arroyo 
were not "waters of the United States."279 The court, while acknow-
ledging that neither the Arroyo del Puerto or San Mateo Creek were 
navigable in fact, disagreed: 
surface flow occasionally occurs, at times of heavy rainfall, provid-
ing a surface connection with navigable waters independent of the 
27°Id. at 375 (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3822). 
271 See Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 375. The court found the mining operation to be a "point 
source" under the CWA. The court did not address the fact that some of the contaminants 
reached the creek through groundwater; rather, the court simply focused on the fact that this 
was a point source. Id. at 584. 
272 See 611 F.2d 345, 346 (10th Cir. 1979). 
273Id. 
274 See id. at 347; see also Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 375. 
275 Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d at 347. 
276Id. The court also noted that "Congress did not in this Act use the term 'navigable waters' 
in the traditional sense; Congress intended to extend the coverage of the act as far as permis-
sible under the Commerce Clause." Id. 
277 Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985). 
278Id. at 127. 
279 Id. 
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underground flow. Additionally, the waters of the Arroyo del Puerto 
and San Mateo Creek soak into the earth's surface, become part 
of the underground aquifers, and after a lengthy period, perhaps 
centuries, the underground water moves toward eventual dis-
charge at Horace Springs or the Rio San Jose.280 
The court focused on the intermittent flow of the Arroyo del Puerto 
and San Mateo Creek into indisputably "navigable waters" as its 
primary justification for including the two bodies of water within the 
CWN.s scope.281 The court also mentioned the underground flow but 
did not address the issue of whether the underground flow alone 
would be enough to bring the waters under the jurisdiction of the 
CWA.282 
2. Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. 
In 1994, Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. addressed the appli-
cability of the CWA to tributary groundwater.283 The United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado analyzed the CWA using 
the CWN.s statutory language and legislative history and an extensive 
investigation of case law.284 The district court concluded that a dis-
charge into groundwater that reaches "navigable waters" is prohib-
ited by the CWA.285 
Sierra Club alleged that Colorado Refining Company's (CRC's) un-
permitted discharges into Sand Creek violated section 301 of the 
CWA.286 Specifically, Sierra Club alleged that CRC illegally had dis-
charged refinery pollutants without a permit into Sand Creek in Adams 
County, Colorado.287 CRC responded that groundwater discharges are 
not regulated by the CWA, even if the pollution discharged into the 
groundwater eventually may migrate through the groundwater into 
surface waters.288 CRC claimed that Sierra Club's first cause of action 
rested solely on allegations that the refinery contaminated groundwa-
280 [d. at 129. 
281 See id. 
282 See Quivira Mining Co., 765 F.2d at 129. 
283 Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (D. Colo. 1993), appeal 
dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994). 
284 [d. at 1432-34. 
285 [d. at 1434. 
286 [d. at 1431 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a». Sierra Club also alleged that CRC's discharges to 
Sand Creek violated CRC's NPDES permits and the CWA and that CRC's failure to determine 
the impact of discharges on Sand Creek violated the CWA. [d. at 1429-30. 
287 [d. at 1431. 
288 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1432. 
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ter that would flow into Sand Creek.289 The groundwater, Sierra Club 
alleged, became contaminated from oil spills and leaks at the refinery 
and was migrating into Sand Creek itself.290 Sierra Club maintained 
that it had made several allegations that CRC was discharging di-
rectly into Sand Creek as well as into the groundwater.291 Regardless, 
the court ruled that it was unclear whether Sierra Club alleged that 
discharges were made directly into Sand Creek and concluded that at 
least part of the first cause of action alleged discharges that reached 
Sand Creek through the soil and groundwater.292 The district court 
therefore determined that it "must decide whether the [CWA's] pro-
hibition of the discharge of any pollutant into 'navigable waters' en-
compasses discharges which reach 'navigable waters' through ground-
water.''293 
The court began its discussion by noting that some courts unequivo-
cally have excluded nontributary groundwater from the CWA.294 Tribu-
tary groundwaters that migrate groundwater back into surface water 
have not been so categorically excluded, and the court conducted an 
investigation of the case law on tributary groundwater.295 
First, the district court distinguished the cases CRC relied on in 
arguing that groundwater discharges are not prohibited by the CWA.296 
The Sierra Club court noted that the holding in Exxon Corp. v. Train 
expressly was limited to nontributary groundwater.297 The court also 
distinguished United States v. GAF Corp., which found no violation 
of the CWA because the groundwater was not alleged to affect surface 
waters.298 The court also noted that United States Steel Corp. v. Train 
highlighted the distinction between tributary and nontributary ground-
water and held that the EPA can regulate disposal into deep wells, at 
least when the regulation occurs in conjunction with limitations on 
discharges into surface waters.299 
289 [d. 
290 [d. 
291 [d. 
292 [d. 
293 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1432. 
294 [d. 
295 [d. at 1432-34. 
296 See id. at 1432. 
297 [d.; see also supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text. 
298 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1432 (citing United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 
1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975». 
299 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1432; see also supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text. 
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The court then examined the contradictory holdings in CWA ground-
water case law.3°O Kelley I, for example, interpreted Exxon as acknow-
ledging the EPA's jurisdiction over wastes that migrate from ground-
waters to surface waters.301 Kelley II reached the opposite conclusion, 
however, and the court noted that it "relied considerably on the opin-
ion in Exxon, despite that court's distinction between tributary and 
nontributary groundwater."302 McClellan v. Weinberger concluded that 
groundwater was within the scope of the CWA if it was naturally 
connected to surface waters.303 New York v. United States also ap-
peared to assume applicability of the CWA to groundwater, declining 
to address whether the CWA applied to groundwaters because it was 
clear the alleged pollutants threatened to contaminate indisputably 
"navigable waters."304 The court also noted that Inland Steel Co. v. 
EPA "tentatively" acknowledged that the legal concept of "navigable 
waters" might include groundwaters connected to surface waters.305 
Town of Norfolk v. United States Corps of Engineers, on the other 
hand, concluded that deference should be given to the Corps's inter-
pretation that the CWA applies only to surface waters.306 
After reviewing these cases and their respective holdings, the Si-
erra Club court acknowledged that the case law clearly was in conflict 
on whether "navigable waters" included groundwater and that there 
was little Tenth Circuit authority on the matter.307 The court noted, 
however, that in United States v. Earth Sciences and Quivira Mining 
Co. v. United States EPA, the Tenth Circuit broadly interpreted 
the scope of the CWA.308 Although Earth Sciences did not deal with 
groundwater,309 the Sierra Club court concluded that the Earth Sci-
ences court's observations were still pertinent, particularly its conclu-
300 See Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433. 
301 Id. (citing Kelley I, No. 79-10199, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 1980)); see also supra 
notes 165-69 and accompanying text. 
302 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing Kelley II, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (W.D. Mich. 
1985)). 
303 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Wein-
berger, 707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Cal. 1988)); see also supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
304 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing New York v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 374 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)); see also supra note 164. 
305 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th 
Cir. 1990)); see also supra notes 224-37 and accompanying text. 
306 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing Town of Norfolk v. United States Corps of 
Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1992)); see also supra note 163. 
307 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433. 
308 Id. 
309 United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc. dealt with discharges into normally dry arroyos. 599 
F.2d 368, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1979); see also supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
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sion that "[i]t seems clear Congress intended to regulate discharges 
into every creek, stream, river or body of water that in any way may 
affect interstate commerce."3l0 Quivira similarly emphasized that "it 
was the clear intent of Congress to regulate waters of the United 
States to the fullest extent possible."311 
The Sierra Club court concluded that the Tenth Circuit "has chosen 
to interpret the terminology of the Clean Water Act broadly .... "312 
Thus, the court found that the CWA prohibits discharges of pollut-
ants that reach "navigable waters" through groundwater.3l3 The court 
found that the Sierra Club's allegations that CRC's discharges mi-
grated into Sand Creek through the groundwater beneath the refinery 
stated a cause of action under the CWA.314 The court thus denied 
CRC's motion to dismiss.3l5 
D. Comparing the Seventh Circuit and Tenth Circuit Approaches 
The case law from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits demonstrates 
how these two circuits have taken different approaches to the CWA 
and its application to groundwater. The Seventh Circuit began with 
a broad approach in United States Steel Corp. v. Train and Inland 
Steel Co. v. EPA, suggesting the possibility that tributary groundwater 
was subject to the CWA.316 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton 
Hudson Corp. then rejected this possibility, excluding all forms of 
310 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (citing Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 375). 
311 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1434 (citing Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 765 F.2d 
126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985»; see also supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text. Another recent 
case from the Tenth Circuit expressed no doubt that the CWA protects tributary groundwater. 
Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1358 (D.N.M. 1995). The 
court looked to the Quivira decision and noted that "the decision and other decisions demon-
strating the Tenth Circuit's expansive construction of the Clean Water Act's jurisdictional reach, 
foreclose any argument that the CWA does not protect groundwater with some connection to 
surface waters." [d., at 1358. The court acknowledged that a minority of courts have held 
otherwise, citing Village of Oconomawoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., but stated that "most 
courts to have considered the issue have held that hydrologically connected groundwaters are 
regulated waters of the United States." [d. Although the requisite hydrological connection to 
surface waters was found lacking in Friends of Santa Fe, the court's language demonstrates 
that another district in the Tenth Circuit is following the same approach as Sierra Club. See id. 
at 1358. 
312 [d. 
313 [d. 
314 [d. The court dismissed CRC's claim that the legislative history of the CWA precluded its 
application to groundwater. [d. at nA. The court stated that commentators like Mary Wood have 
concluded that this legislative history is inconclusive. [d. 
315 [d. at 1434. 
316 See Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990); United States Steel Corp. 
v. Train, 566 F.2d 822, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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groundwater from the CWA.317 The Tenth Circuit, in contrast, consis-
tently has interpreted "navigable waters" broadly.3l8 Sierra Club 
reflected this broad approach in its holding that tributary groundwa-
ter is protected by the CWA.319 
United States v. Byrd stated that "navigable waters" comprise all 
waters within the confines of the United States and thus found the 
CWA to apply to wetlands.320 United States Steel Corp. v. Train pro-
tected groundwater by allowing CWA regulation of deep well disposal 
when undertaken in conjunction with surface water regulations.32l In-
land Steel Co. v. EPA then declined to rule on whether discharges into 
tributary groundwater could be regulated by the CWA.322 The court 
in Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp. ruled where 
Inland declined to rule, however, taking a narrow view of "navigable 
waters" by excluding even tributary groundwater from the CWA.323 
The Tenth Circuit, in contrast, consistently has interpreted "navi-
gable waters" broadly. The Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction over sur-
face tributaries that were not navigable-in-fact in United States v. 
Earth Sciences Inc., United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., and Quivira 
Mining Co. v. United States EPA.324 The Tenth Circuit court also let 
the Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. decision stand, allowing the 
District Court of Colorado expressly to include tributary groundwa-
ter within the CWA.325 
Although Tenth Circuit cases look to the CW Pis language, legisla-
tive history, and administrative interpretations to analyze groundwa-
ter cases, the cases continually focus on the intent of the CWA.326 All 
317 See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir.), em. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 322 (1994). 
318 See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979); Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining 
Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993), appeal dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994). 
319 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1434. 
320 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979). 
321 United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977). 
322 Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (7th Cir. 1990). 
323 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965--66 (7th Cir.), em. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 322 (1994). 
324 Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 
599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979). 
325 Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993), appeal 
dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994). 
326 See, e.g., Quivira, 765 F.2d at 130; Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d at 347; Earth Sciences, 
599 F.2d at 373; Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp at 1433-34. 
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of the Tenth Circuit cases refer to and have interpreted broadly the 
intent of the CWA.327 Earth Sciences relied on the intent of the CWA 
to maintain the integrity of the nation's waters.328 United States v. 
Texas Pipe Line Co. found that the CWA was intended to cover all 
tributaries of "navigable waters."329 Quivira Mining Co. v. United 
States EPA noted that the goal of the CWA was to eliminate dis-
charges into navigable waters.330 Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. 
included tributary groundwater within "navigable waters" because of 
the declared goal and policy of the CWA to restore and maintain the 
integrity of the nation's waters.331 
The Seventh Circuit has used more formalistic reasoning than the 
Tenth Circuit in reaching its holdings. United States Steel Corp. v. 
Train concluded that the legislative history and statutory construc-
tion of the CWA indicate that the CWA did cover groundwater.332 
Hoffman Homes Inc. v. Administrator looked to the EPA's regula-
tions to determine if a wetland was covered by the CWA.333 Village of 
Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp. relied on a strict reading 
of the EPA's regulatory definition in deciding that an artificial reten-
tion pond was not covered by the CWA.334 Oconomowoc acknowledged 
that the CWA is a broad statute, but that court stated that the CWA 
does not grant federal authority over every drop of water.335 The 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have thus taken different approaches to 
the tributary groundwater issue, and each circuit makes sound argu-
ments for its respective position. 
IV. WHY COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER 
PART OF "NAVIGABLE WATERS" UNDER THE CWA 
The case law from the inception of the CWA through the present 
reveals that courts have been unable to reach unanimity on whether 
tributary groundwater should be considered part of "navigable wa-
327 See, e.g., Quivira, 765 F.2d at 130; Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d at 347; Earth Sciences, 
599 F.2d at 373; Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp at 1433-34. 
328 Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373. 
329 Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d at 347. 
330 Quivira, 765 F.2d at 129. 
331 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1434. 
332 United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 851-53 (7th Cir. 1977). 
333 Hoffman Homes Inc. v. Administrator, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993). 
334 Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994). 
336 [d. at 964. 
" 
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ters."336 The conflicting views of the Oconomowoc and Sierra Club v. 
Colorado Refining Co. decisions demonstrate that courts still are 
divided on the tributary groundwater issue and show how different 
methodologies are employed to reach contrary conclusions.337 Sierra 
Club gave effect to the broad intent of the CWA to protect the nation's 
waters, basing its holding on the expansive application that "naviga-
ble waters" has received in the Tenth Circuit.338 Oconomowoc, on the 
other hand, looked to the legislative history and the EPA's interpre-
tation of the CWA, deciding that tributary groundwater intentionally 
was omitted from CWA jurisdiction.33g 
Courts should follow the approach and reasoning of the Tenth Cir-
cuit and Sierra Club and should seek to promote the intent of the 
CWA by interpreting "navigable waters" to include tributary ground-
water. Only by including tributary groundwater within "navigable 
waters" can the CWA fulfill its stated objective of "restor[ing] and 
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."340 Excluding tributary groundwater from CWA ju-
risdiction undermines the broad policy goals of the CWA because 
pollutants that legally cannot be discharged into surface waters still 
may find their way into surface waters through polluted tributary 
groundwater.341 
As noted above, the CW A's language, legislative history, and admin-
istrative interpretations do not address definitively whether ground-
water is included within the scope of the CWA.342 The CWA states 
that a permit must be obtained for any discharge into "navigable 
waters."343 The CWA then defines "navigable waters" as "waters of 
the United States, including the territorial seas."344 Based on this 
language alone, it would appear that any groundwater falls within the 
scope of the CWA. Administrative regulations have further defined 
"waters of the United States," but these regulations express a nar-
rower view than the CWA language itself implies.345 While these 
regulations provide examples of navigable waters, they do not ad-
336 Compare Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965 with Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. 
Supp. 1428, 1433-44 (D. Colo. 1993), appeal dismissed, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994). 
3m See Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 965; Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433-34. 
338 Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1434. 
339 See Oconomowoc, 24 F.3d at 964~5. 
340 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
341 See Wood, supra note 17, at 592. 
342 See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. 
343 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
:144 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
345 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3); see supra note 115. 
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dress explicitly the status of groundwater.346 As several cases have 
shown, arguments for the inclusion of tributary groundwater are 
supportable by the CWA and the CW Ns legislative history. 
Other jurisdictions have followed the Tenth Circuit's approach to 
tributary groundwater.347 The most compelling argument for including 
groundwater within the definition of "navigable waters" is found in 
Ashland, the earliest major case to address the scope of "navigable 
waters" under the CWA.348 Ashland stated that the CWA would be a 
mockery if Congress's "authority to control pollution was limited to 
the bed of the navigable stream itself. The tributaries which join to 
form the river could then be used as open sewers as far as federal 
regulation was concerned."349 While Ashland addressed the pollution 
of an above-ground tributary, the reasoning applies equally to tribu-
tary groundwater.35o The CWA cannot effectively prevent the pollu-
tion of "navigable waters" if it is interpreted to allow a polluter to do 
indirectly what it is not allowed to do directly.351 Courts should take 
the approach of Ashland and focus not on the nature of the water into 
which the pollution initially is discharged, but rather on the ultimate 
destination of the pollution.352 It makes no sense to prohibit discharges 
directly into a stream, yet to allow discharges into groundwater even 
though the pollutants will migrate through the groundwater into the 
very same stream. 
Furthermore, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the only 
United States Supreme Court case to address the scope of "navigable 
waters," also supports the inclusion of tributary groundwater in the 
CWA.353 Riverside broadly interpreted the CWA to include wetlands 
and noted that wetlands often filter and purify water that drains into 
adjacent water bodies.354 The Court's reasoning thus suggests that 
groundwater hydrologically connected to "navigable waters" also falls 
within the jurisdiction of the CWA.355 The Court's broad interpreta-
tion of "waters of the United States" is consistent with the goal of the 
346 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3); see supra note 115. 
347 See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
348 Ashland, 504 F.2d at 1326. 
349 [d. 
350 See id. 
351 See id. 
352 See id. 
353 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985); see supra 
notes 193-98 and accompanying text. 
354 [d. 
355 See id. 
" 
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CWA-to protect the nation's waters to the fullest extent.356 Riverside 
bolsters those cases that have applied the CWA to tributary ground-
water because of the CW Ns broad intent while weakening those cases 
excluding tributary groundwater by relying solely on a close reading 
of the language or interpretation of legislative history.357 
Some commentators have argued that groundwater pollution con-
trol should be left to the states because of the states' varying approaches 
to groundwater regulation.358 The disparate state approaches, how-
ever, also support including tributary groundwater within "navigable 
waters." For example, one state might impose strict controls on tribu-
tary groundwater pollution, while a neighboring state has limited 
groundwater protections. Water pollution, however, does not obey 
state boundaries. Pollution from the unregulated states easily could 
migrate across state lines and foil the regulating state's attempts to 
protect both its groundwater and surface waters. Including tributary 
groundwater in the CWNs jurisdiction would facilitate uniform treat-
ment of groundwater throughout the country and would help elimi-
nate problems of interstate pollution migration. 
The Tenth Circuit and Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co. ap-
proach does not impose federal authority over every drop of water, a 
concern of the Seventh Circuit expressed in Village of Oconomowoc 
356 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
357 See Town of Norfolk v. United States Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir.1992) 
(citing Riverside to support its conclusion that the determination of whether "waters of the 
United States" should include groundwater connected to surface waters was a matter of 
ecological judgment and should be left to the discretion of the EPA and the Corps. 968 F.2d at 
1451); but see McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1195-96 
(E.D. Cal. 1988); supra notes 179--82 and accompanying text. McClellan v. Weinberger rejected 
plaintiff's argument that Riverside plainly required NPDES permits for discharges to ground-
water. McClellan v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. at 1195. The court distinguished Riverside on the 
grounds that it involved surface waters only, not groundwaters. [d. at 1195. McClellan v. 
Weinberger also noted that Riverside addressed the reasonableness of the Corps's determination 
that the CWA required permits for filling wetlands, whereas in McClellan v. Weinberger the 
plaintiff's interpretation directly conflicted with the EPA's interpretation. [d. at 1195-96. 
The McClellan v. Weinberger court, however, addressed isolated groundwater, not tributary 
groundwater, and the court repeatedly emphasized this fact. [d. at 1194-95. The court remanded 
the case for further discovery on whether the groundwater in question was hydrologically 
connected to "navigable waters" under the CWA. [d. at 1196. Thus, despite its emphasis on 
distinguishing Riverside, McClellan v. Weinberger's remand for further discovery on the hydro-
logical connection supports the conclusion that tributary groundwater is covered under the 
CWA. See id. at 1196. 
358 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
CWA). 
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Lake v. Dayton Hudson COrp.359 Rather, it imposes authority over 
tributary groundwater only.360 Although it may be arguable that non-
tributary groundwater is covered by the CWA, the Tenth Circuit only 
includes tributary groundwater. Including tributary groundwater di-
rectly serves the intent of the CWA even when one reads "navigable 
waters" and "waters of the United States" to comprise only surface 
waters. Protecting tributary groundwater is imperative if these sur-
face waters are to be adequately protected. Maintaining the integrity 
of tributary groundwater is simply a beneficial by-product of the 
protection of surface "navigable waters." 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although groundwater is acknowledged as a crucial part of the 
water systems of the United States, groundwater has not received 
the same extensive federal protections as surface waters. The CWA 
does offer some protection for groundwater, however. In the absence 
of comprehensive federal groundwater legislation the CWA can be an 
effective tool to prevent the pollution of tributary groundwater. The 
CWA contains provisions to protect the "navigable waters" and "wa-
ters of the United States" from contamination. While the CWA has 
not been applied to isolated, nontributary groundwater, some courts 
have construed the provisions to include tributary groundwater. In-
cluding tributary groundwater in the CWA enables the NPDES to 
apply to discharges into tributary groundwater as well as surface 
waters. 
Courts have been divided on whether tributary groundwater is 
protected by the CW A. In order for the CWA to fulfill its stated 
objective "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters,"361 courts should adopt the ap-
proach of the Tenth Circuit and Sierra Club. The Tenth Circuit and 
Sierra Club decisions interpreted the CWA broadly and attempted to 
give effect to the CW.lts intent by protecting tributary groundwater. 
Although groundwater protection is not a stated goal of the CWA, the 
protection of tributary groundwater is necessary to protect the sur-
face waters of the United States and to fulfill this intent of the CWA. 
Allowing tributary groundwaters to be excluded from the CWA un-
359 See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 322 (1994). 
360 Id. 
361Id. 
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dermines the CWNs protection of surface waters because polluted 
tributary groundwaters may contaminate surface waters. The Tenth 
Circuit approach eliminates this possibility by asserting CWA juris-
diction over tributary groundwater. All jurisdictions should adopt the 
Tenth Circuit approach and allow the CWA to truly protect the na-
tion's "navigable waters" by protecting tributary groundwater. 
